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This decade has seen an unprecedented amount of legislation
in the area of federal defense procurement; legislation that covers
a broad spectrum of issues involving the Department of Defense
(DOD) weapons acquisition system. In 1988 alone, Congress
passed eight laws' embodying fifty-four separate provisions2
affecting the system. The reforms were in response to what is
often described as a failed acquisition system.3
William Burnett and William Kovacic examine procurement
reform in great detail and with considerable insight. They
conclude that the "new" emphasis on competition in the acquisi-
tion of major weapon systems is the most significant of all the
regulatory reforms enacted by Congress in the past decade. They
argue that efforts to introduce competition have resulted in the
use of dual-sourcing as the preferred acquisition technique and
note that the teaming of rival contractors in early design phases
permits subsequent competition in follow-on procurements.
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This Comment provides an assessment of Burnett and Kovacic's
views from the perspective of practitioners. In our view, some
reform legislation, regulations, and practices have introduced into
the present procurement system needless adversarialism, addition-
al complexities, and greater inefficiencies. Part I of this Comment
addresses Burnett and Kovacic's failure to differentiate among the
acquisition phases4 that are the subject of the current emphasis on
competition. It also cautions against increased Congressional
regulation of the military procurement process. Part II discusses
the advantages and disadvantages of competition to manufactur-
ers. Part III warns that policymakers must be wary of overempha-
sizing the value of price competition. This Comment concludes
that policymakers should continue to formulate policy not just by
focusing on dollars saved, but on how to achieve our overall
national objectives of a strong industrial base to provide for the
country's long-term defense needs.
I. General Comments
A. Methodology
Burnett and Kovacic focus on four programs that they
characterize as being typical of those incorporating DOD's new
procurement policies.' However, these programs are so large that
they are not truly representative of the totality of acquisitions
affected by the reform efforts.8 They constitute only a relatively
small portion of DOD's total procurement budget.' The new DOD
4. DOD Directive 5000.1 prescribes four acquisition phases: (1) concept
exploration/definition; (2) concept demonstration/validation; (3) full-scale development and,
as appropriate, low-rate initial production; and (4) full-rate production and initial
deployment. Thereafter, the Directive requires periodic review of the acquired product. U.S.
DEP'T ov DENsF., Dn'.erivE No. 5000.1. at 3-4 (Sept. 1, 1987) [hereinafter DutaCrivE No.
5000.1].
5. The four programs are the Advanced Tactical Fighter, the Advanced Tactical
Aircraft, the light Helicopter Experimental, and the V-22 Tilt-rotor Aircraft.
6. We see no methodological problem with this analysis; we make this distinction,
however, because regulatory reform, in its totality, involves project procurements that in
many ways differ greatly from the new, very large, aerodynamic weapon systems discussed
in the article.
7. These four programs constitute less than 7% of the estimated costs, and 4% of
the 99 unclassified major programs being reported to Congress under the Selected
Acquisition Report (SAR) system. See Pentagon Summarizes SARs for Dec. 31, 1988, 149 AEAo-
srAcE DmLY 421. 421-22 (1989) (percentages calculated using DOD tabulation of SARa of
major weapon systems).
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procurement regulations and procedures go considerably beyond
the category of major weapon systems8 examined by the authors.
Although the authors correctly assert that the new emphasis on
competition is a significant factor in DOD's procedure for
acquiring major weapon systems,9 they do not clearly explain at
what stage of the process this change in emphasis is taking place.
Competition in the pre-full-scale development (FSD) phase of the
acquisitions process clearly existed prior to the recent reform
movement. In fact, its use in the early stages of project devel-
opment is no more pervasive today than it was in the 1960s and
1970s.0
The significant change in the new procurement regulations
concerns competition during the production phase. Burnett and
Kovacic correctly identify competitive teaming, dual-sourcing, and
source breakout as procedures employed in the later stages of the
acquisition process to attain increased competition for major
weapon systems. As the authors explain, in many instances,
neither Congress nor DOD has properly evaluated the risks of
teaming and dual-sourcing. Weaknesses in the institutional
processes that develop and apply competition strategy are likely
to result in failure to consider alternative approaches for
accomplishing competition-related objectives. Such failures can be
costly. New policies and procedures associated with all large-
systems contracts, not just major weapon systems, must be
evaluated regularly.
B. Congressional Oversight
Burnett and Kovacic conclude that substantial, continuing
government intervention and Congressional oversight is necessary
for successful implementation of acquisition reform." No one
would argue that DOD's expenditure of federal funds should not
8. The generally accepted definition of a major weapon system is one that is estimated
to exceed $200 million in costs for research, development, tests, and evaluation, or $1
billion in production costs. See DIRECIVE No. 5000.1, supra note 4, at 4.
9. See Burnett & Kovacic, supra note 3, at 252-54, 260-61.
10. Alternative competitive approaches for conceptual designs of new systems, along
with competitive demonstration and validation of the winning concepts, were employed in
the McNamara era of the 1960s. Subsequently, in the 1970s, David Packard, who was
serving as Deputy Secretary of Defense, further developed procedures that require
competition. For a compilation of the criteria to be considered in developing appropriate
strategies in the current acquisition process, see DIuwrtvE 5000.1, supra note 4, at 5-6.
11. See Burnett & Kovacic, supra note 3, at 304-05, 307-10.
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be subject to Congressional oversight. However, one of the most
significant problems with the weapons acquisition process is that
no specific person or body is given sole responsibility; individual
accountability is almost always lacking.'" Congress traditionally
oversees the implementation of the law through hearings, reports,
GAO studies, and staff investigations. Yet, in light of allegations
of mismanagement in the acquisition process, and a growing
impatience with the slow pace of self-initiated reform by acquisi-
tion managers, Congress has assumed a hands-on approach in this
area of regulatory reform. It has manifested a preference not only
for prescribing the objectives sought, but also for enumerating in
detail the processes and procedures whereby these objectives are
to be accomplished."
By adopting this regulatory approach, Congress may have
inadvertently immersed itself in the procurement process to a
disproportionate degree, focusing more on practices and proce-
dures than on the broader policy goal of satisfying the country's
national defense requirements. Procurement by prescription
inevitably circumscribes the exercise of essential managerial
judgment and limits the ability of the professional work force to
tailor acquisition strategies to meet the multifaceted needs of
individual projects. Congress's propensity to measure "improve-
ment" in quantitative terms, such as the percentage of procure-
ment dollars subject to competition, has resulted in a procure-
ment strategy that overemphasizes the attainment of goals and
milestones instead of qualitatively assessing whether reform
measures improve national defense capabilities in a cost-effective
manner. While Congressional oversight of the acquisition process
and its management is both desirable and essential, this regulation
should not supplant the responsibility of the procurement work
force to exercise discretion in making daily decisions on a
case-by-case basis. 14
12. The participants who share in responsibility for the acquisition process include
many committees of the Congress; competition, streamlining, and small business advocates;
staff elements; and other special interest groups.
13. One of the first expressions of Congress's hands-on approach is the Competition
in Contracting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG & ADmIN. NEws (98
Stat.) 1175 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 31 & 41 U.S.C.). Every year
since 1984, similar legislation has been passed that collectively resulted in sweeping
procurement reform. See supra note 1.
14. Procurement reform is ultimately dependent on the quality and judgment of the
procurement work force. As Burnett and Kovacic point out, Congress and DOD should
commit themselves to "raising the capability of DOD's acquisition personnel." See Burnett
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II. Competition, Dual-Sourcing, and Teaming
As Burnett and Kovacic indicate, competition through dual-
sourcing and teaming has advantages that improve the defense
acquisition process in a number of ways. But competition also
has important disadvantages. This Part first discusses some of
competition's advantages, and then explains several disadvantages
that are often overlooked when assessing the net benefits of a
competitive acquisition process.
A. Advantages of Competition
Burnett and Kovacic provide an excellent discussion of the
advantages of competition for the government. For example,
competitive bidding on contracts can save an average of twenty-
five percent of the initial purchase price of many items. 5 In
addition to paying lower prices, the government frequently
realizes other important returns from competition in the acquisi-
tion process. These include broadening the industrial base,
increasing manufacturing efficiencies through the sharing of
managerial and technical expertise, resolving scheduling and
technical problems, enlarging market shares for efficient produc-
ers, and restoring public confidence in the acquisition process.
It is important to recognize that, to a significant degree, advan-
tages accruing to the government from a competitive process also
benefit suppliers and contractors.
1. Broadening of the Industrial Base
The transfer of technical knowledge and expertise among
companies participating in dual-sourcing, in leader-follower
arrangements, or in joint development ventures facilitates the
growth of new capabilities and new sources of supply. This
contributes to a wider industrial base available to meet future
& Kovacic, supra note 3, at 306.
15. Martin Marietta now expects similar savings through competitive bidding of its
subcontracted components. However, these savings are not life cycle savings. The savings
associated with production unit prices comprise only one aspect of a multidimensional cost
model. For example, cost models should include added costs for in-service supply and
maintenance of units manufactured by more than one manufacturer, increased investments
for production tooling, and added costs caused by delayed procurement associated with the
qualification of second sources. These and other factors that add costs are discussed in Part
HI.B.
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government needs."' For example, the existence of multiple
producers enhances the military's surge capability, thereby making
possible a rapid increase in the rate of production of essential
supplies and materiel in the event of a national emergency or
mobilization. Furthermore, multiple-sourcing increases the
country's security by making the interdiction of delivery of
essential goods and services more difficult in times of war. During
peacetime, there exists a similar benefit to having more than one
current supplier in place, given the potential for strikes, acts of
God, or other incidents that can disrupt the production of
essential spare parts or other supplies necessary for operational
readiness.
2. Efficiencies Through Shared Managerial and Technical Expertise
Dual-sourcing and teaming provide an opportunity for defense
contractors to share managerial and technical expertise. This
increases the economies and efficiencies of most business opera-
tions, and it can improve significantly both the technical excel-
lence and operational suitability of manufactured systems. For
example, two of Martin Marietta's most prominent dual-sourced
programs are the Army Hellfire missile 7 and the Navy Vertical
Launching System." In the case of the Hellfire missile, Martin
Marietta and Rockwell International each initially designed and
manufactured a subassembly. Upon the Army's initiative, each
firm cross-trained the other to manufacture its subassembly so
that both companies could manufacture the entire missile. Since
then, the two firms have competed against each other on a yearly
basis for the larger share of the succeeding year's production."
The history of the Vertical Launching System is similar to that of
the Hellfire Missile. The Navy paid Martin Marietta to transfer
16. Recent data indeed suggest that the country's military supplier base is decreasing.
According to the Pentagon, the number of companies providing products to DOD has
shrunk from 118,000 firms in 1982 to fewer than 40,000 in 1987. See Blackwell & Gaffney,
Save the Milita y-Jndustrial Complex, Chi. Tribune, Mar. 22, 1989, § 1, at 13, col. 2.
17. This antitank missile system is launched by helicopter.
18. The VLS is a shipboard weapon system that houses and Launches air defense,
antisubmarine, and surface-to-surface missiles.
19. The results presumably have pleased the Army. The nation now has two
exceptionally well-qualified sources, and the reliability and quality of missile rounds are
superb. All 111 Martin Marietta production lot missiles that were fired and scored have
performed successfully. See MAaIIN MAIU.,TA CoRP., 1988 ANNUAL R.PoT 12 (1989)
[hereinafter 1988 ANNUAL RI owr].
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design and manufacturing plans to the FMC Corporation to
establish a production phase competitor10 Both companies now
produce the launching system. In addition, the Navy has "broken
out" one major subassembly for manufacture by a third party.
3. Resolution of Technical and Scheduling Problems
By providing an incentive to solve problems as they arise,
competition helps increase efficiency by inducing solutions to
technical and scheduling problems in existing programs. In the
absence of competition, sole-source suppliers may curtail service.
4. Increased Market Share for Efficient Firms
Competition can increase a firm's revenue by providing it with
market shares in a product it may not have had if the system
were sole-sourced. For example, Martin Marietta currently is
involved in three programs that are being modified from
sole-source procurements, in which Martin Marietta was not
involved, to dual-source arrangements.2 Martin Marietta teamed
with the initial design firms in the development or manufacture
of equipment as a prelude to competition for future production
runs. If these competitions are won, Martin Marietta will receive
shares of the respective markets for these three items that it
would not have had under the sole-source arrangement.
5. Restoration of Public Confidence
The use of competition can help restore public confidence in
the procurement process since many people prefer competition to
sole-source contracts. Therefore, a procurement strategy that
employs competition in all possible situations is seen by the
media, the public, and Congress as superior to one that uses
competition less frequently. Although this perceived superiority
is questioned in some situations, competition has value both to
government agencies and to industry suppliers that use public
funds.
20. This product was designed and developed by Martin Marietta after a competitive
selection process.
21. The three dual-source programs in which Martin Marietta is involved are the
MK-50 Torpedo with Honeywell; the Consolidated Automatic Support System with General
Electric; and the Advanced Anti-Tank Weapon System-Medium with Texas Instruments.
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B. Disadvantages of Competition
Despite the advantages of competition, experience has revealed
some of the paradoxes that result from competitive strategies.
Although competition fosters near-term economies of scale and
efficiencies, it can also have detrimental effects that ultimately
add costs that normally are not considered when assessing savings
realized from a competitive procurement." These include
destroying supplier relationships, disrupting the development of
new systems, deterring investments in plant and equipment,
producing at uneconomical rates, diminishing design-agent
responsibility, preventing economies of scale, and lowering rates
of return to unacceptable levels.
1. Destruction of Supplier Relationships
Competition has the potential to destroy supplier relationships.
Supplier loyalties stemming from good relationships provide
inestimable benefits to all buyers of goods and services. Dr. W.
Edwards Deming, a quality control expert and management
consultant, recommends that to build efficiency, the Pentagon
should "settle on one supplier and build long-term relation-
ships."2  He specifically scorns many of the features of competi-
tive bidding in favor of cooperative working relationships.
Unfortunately, relationships between the federal government and
its prime contractor suppliers are more strained today than ever
before. Although competition is not the sole reason for this
problem, its extensive use is one of the contributing factors.
We have found that suppliers with whom we have established
good working relationships often have performed far beyond
22. Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Everett Pyatt's excellent critique of Burnett and
Kovadc's article presents a strong case for weapon systems competition. See Pyatt,
Procurement Competition at Work. The Navy's Experience, YALE J. ON RE.G. 319 (1989). The savings
demonstrated by the Navy's increased efforts to obtain competition are impressive. However,
there are many hidden costs that do not show up in reduced purchase prices for weapon
systems as shown in some of the Navy's examples. This does not mean that the Navy
programs he discusses should not have been competed. Rather, we believe there are costs
to competition that are not now adequately revealed, assessed, or weighed in the current
defense acquisition system.
23. Speech by Dr. W. Edwards Deming to Pentagon Officials (May 24, 1988)
(unpublished speech on file with authors).
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expectations.2 4 Frequent competitions and low bidder awards
greatly disrupt these relationships, and hence, in the long run,
may not truly be cost effective. A dramatic case, illustrating a
similar type of relationship, occurred in 1982 when a bank with
which Martin Marietta had a long association stood by the
company during an attempted hostile takeover. 5 If the bank had
not supported the corporation, it is likely that ownership would
have changed, and the effectiveness and vitality of the firm would
have diminished.
2. Disruptions in the Timely and Efficient Development and Produc-
tion of New Systems
In order to achieve effective competition, the government must
first articulate its requirements in a manner that communicates to
all prospective offerors what is required under the contract. The
compilation of an effective and comprehensive solicitation package
for a weapon system is a time-consuming, expensive, and labor-
intensive process. The same may be said of the proposal evalua-
tion and source selection conducted both by the prospective
contractors and by the government. Protracted procurement lead
time inevitably adds to the costs incurred by the competing
offerors, which in turn increases the price of the contracted-for
items. To the extent that this time-intensive effort delays the
transition from development to production for the incumbent
contractor, there may well be added risks and costs for the
military branch that needs the item. As in any business undertak-
ing, committing finite resources to such ongoing efforts can result
in lost opportunities and a lower commitment of resources to
other potential contracts.
24. Martin Marietta specializes in "system integration" work involving skillful blending
of technical and managerial skills of large numbers of suppliers. The best teams are formed
by careful selection-not by full and open competition. We have found that with most
team members, strong subcontract management relationships and cooperative efforts in
resolving technical problems and lowering prices are often more effective than open
competition designed to do the same thing.
25. For a discussion of the role that banks played in Martin Marietta's hostile takeover
defense, see generally A. Sioxu, TiuR' PLUS ONE EQUALS Bu iioNs: TnE BENDIx-MARIN
MAXurrA Wsa 150, 170-81 (1983).
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3. Deterrence of Investments in Plant and Equipment
A prospective contractor not only must be responsive to a
solicitation, but also must have the resources and capabilities to
perform immediately. Because of the lead time necessary to
acquire personnel, tools, plant, equipment, and resources to meet
prescribed delivery schedules, a contractor must commit resources
in advance of the contract award, often at the expense of
alternative uses. In the present climate of budgetary and fiscal
uncertainty, there is reduced confidence both that the program
will be awarded and that, even if it is awarded, the planned
quantities will be procured and not delayed or partially termi-
nated. The cumulative effect of this uncertainty is the additional
risk borne by prospective contractors that such costs will not be
recouped, through no fault of the contractor. In a competitive
market, these costs are not borne exclusively by the successful
competitor, but by all offerors and ultimately the federal govern-
ment.
4. Production at Uneconomical Rates
Because of the high cost of sophisticated military hardware
and the constraints on DOD's budget, the total quantities planned
for procurement often do not represent the optimal number in
terms of minimizing acquisition costs. Similarly, weapon systems
often are not procured at rates that permit the exploitation of
available economies of scale. This inefficiency is exacerbated when
the estimated quantity to be produced is divided between two
concurrent production lines, at least one of which often must be
maintained at a minimally efficient production rate. Neither
producer may be able to produce at an optimal rate at any given
point in time. Even the potential for competition may discourage
incumbent contractors from making further investments in labor
and cost saving capital items for fear that such resources may
become excess or idle; should there be less or no follow-on
business due to competition, the allocation of these costs- to future
contracts is prohibited. 6
26. See 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-23 (1987).
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5. Diminished Design-Agent Responsibility
On the basis of past experience, it is safe to generalize that the
last item produced rarely replicates in its entirety the first item
produced." This phenomenon is due in large part to constantly
evolving technology, knowledge gained from the use of delivered
items, changes in design to decrease manufacturing cost and to
improve reliability and maintainability, and the shifting perception
of potential military threats. The evolutionary development of a
weapon is not easily accomplished if the developer responsible for
its design is no longer involved in its production. There is no
assurance that the development contractor will be awarded a
subsequent contract for production. Dual-source competition is
predicated on two primary considerations: price and ability to
manufacture. Little or no weight is assigned to the potential
capability of the successor contractor to redesign, enhance, or
modify the product being produced to meet new and more
stringent requirements. Frequently, the presence or retention of
such resources makes the design agent relatively less price
competitive than successive offerors who are required to have
only those capabilities essential to build-to-print.
6. Unachievable Economies of Scale for Vendor/Subcontracted Items
As shown by the problems that plague the acquisition of spare
and replenishment parts, the nonrecurring costs of tooling, plant
rearrangement, and production set-up constitute a significant
portion of any subcontracted item's price. The inability to acquire
27. The Titan family of space launch vehicles is an example of excellent product
growth that is possible when one design agent can remain fully committed to a program.
The Titan program started in the mid-1950s with the Titan I Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile. Now, 30 years after the first launch, a much larger and more capable Titan IV
is being produced to meet the nation's requirements for a heavy, expendable launch vehicle
during the 1990s. The Titan IV, the 14th model, is the latest in a progression of models
with a greatly expanded capability flowing from the initial basic design. Also, the Titan
space launch vehicles have had an enviable 96% operational success rate over their 23 year
history. See 1988 ANiWAL. REPORT, supra note 19, at 4. We believe that the original source can
handle both product growth and reliability better than second or alternate sources.
Of course, the Titan program is not unique. All three of the military branches have
major programs that have been retained in the past by original sources with beneficial
results. We are concerned, however, that in the new drive to develop second sources and
gain competition, acquisition strategy planners will overlook this very important aspect of
product growth flowing from initial design and manufacturing teams.
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vendor and subcontracted items, particularly when such acquisi-
tions are for items unique to the weapon system in question, adds
to their procurement costs. There is uncertainty and program
instability even for weapon systems for which competition is either
no longer feasible or planned due to potential program stretch-
outs or cancellation. When coupled with the uncertainty of the
remaining quantities to be produced, prime contractors are
understandably reluctant to order subcontracted items beyond
those required to perform under the instant contract. The
government often will not cover expenses associated with
acquiring items in advance or in excess of immediate needs; these
near-term expenses must be financed by the contractor.8
7. Low Rates of Return
Martin Marietta's Hellfire missile project is a good example of
the way competition can result in perilously low levels of return
for defense contractors."0 Internal rates of return for this program
are insufficient by most private sector business standards.0 From
a prudent business perspective, it is difficult to justify producing
the missile either on the basis of profit on investment or profit
as a percentage of either costs or selling price."
28. Interest cost is not an expense that may be allocated against government contracts.
See 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-20 (1987).
29. On the Hellfire project, we cannot speak for our competitor, but it is reasonable
to believe that they are experiencing similarly low returns. The potential problem generally
faced by the industry as a whole is indicated by one analyst who "forecasts a 25% drop in
earnings for the aerospace group by 1991 based on current spending trends and the
assumption that most of these cash-squeezing policies will persist." Wall St. J., Apr. 14,
1988, at 14, col. 3. Don Fuqua, President of the Aerospace Industries Association, discussed
these low rates of return in a recent address to the Association. He noted that "so-called
procurement reforms threaten [the aerospace] industry with substantially increased risk and
sharply reduced profits." Address by Don Fuqua, Aerospace Industries Association Year-
end Review and Forecast Luncheon (Dec. 13, 1988), reprinted in 2 KEY SPEECHES 1, 4 (1989).
He stated that the rate of return on defense business had been reduced on some projects
to less than half of what analysts consider acceptable. Id.
30. Pretax return on sales for Martin Marietta's Electronics and Missiles segment
averaged 9.69% during the years 1986-88. 1988 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 36-37.
Current return on the Hellfire project is approximately one-fourth of this average.
31. In the long run, no firm regardless of size can operate under free market
conditions for capital formation and at the same time sell its products in a monopsonistic
market at prices that do not result in competitive rates of return. One or two programs
typically can be carried in this manner as long as the average return for a firm meets
essential "hurdle" rates, but there is clearly a limit to this type of pricing. The sole
justification for continuing to produce such items is the return of good will and reputation.
Vol. 6: 333, 1989
Experiences of the Manufacturer
It is commonly claimed, by those who as a matter of principle
defend competition for all weapon systems, that defense contrac-
tors are not forced to bid prices that will yield inadequate
returns. However, defense contractors face constraints caused by
unilateral customer requirements and decisions that firms in other
industries normally do not face. Military suppliers provide a
unique product that fulfills national security objectives. As a
result, their discretion to discontinue unprofitable programs is
constrained severely.
In addition, because the federal government is the sole
domestic purchaser of most of a defense contractor's output,
defense contractors face many of the same problems that plague
suppliers in any monopsonistic market." Existing investments in
plant and equipment require distribution of costs on a sufficiently
broad base to insure that programs are competitively priced. This
sometimes requires the bidding of pivotal programs at low
margins. In addition, contractors must bid on some programs
without adequate levels of return to keep technical teams together
for future work.
Low returns on programs can lead to problems that would not
otherwise occur. In an effort to increase the rate of excessively
low returns, management may combat costs in such a way that
the end product suffers, including reducing research expenditures
and investment in productivity." When this occurs, the "lowest
cost" and the "best product" are not necessarily synonymous.
III. Excessive Emphasis on Policy Initiatives
On occasion, DOD and some Congressional committees and
members overreact to policy initiatives. Examples in military
procurement are the multiple-incentive contracts in the 1960s,
total package procurement in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and
32. For a discussion of monopsony and the problems of pricing at levels insufficient
to meet the marginal cost of production, see E. Snows & R. BUvrON, MICROECONOMics 435-
38 (1972).
33. For example, a firm's top talent generally will not be used on a project that does
not earn adequate profits, unless the project returns are so low that they threaten the
solvency of the corporation. In addition, efforts to save money by applying reduced design
talent, reduced grade levels in manufacturing, and shortcuts in testing often are counterpro-
ductive.
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fixed-price development contracts in the 1980s. 4 Unfortunately,
the same kind of overreaction to policy initiatives that plagued
past acquisition strategies are being repeated today with the
increased emphasis on price competition alone.
There are understandable and defensible pressures to award
contracts at the lowest possible purchase price. Budgetary
shortages and a fundamental need to buy the most suitable article
at the lowest price dictate emphasis on such considerations. The
overreaction to which we refer, however, is a tendency when
selecting a competitor for contract award to overemphasize price,
contractor investment in design and development, and contractor
willingness to surrender rights in technical data.
This tendency exists because factors such as price and invest-
ment are more easily quantified and, hence, are more defensible
than factors such as past performance records and expected
product quality. Micromanagement from above, public criticism,
and a lack of trust between buyers and sellers have reduced the
flexibility of decisionmakers' judgment that is so important for an
efficient and effective production process. Government and
industry should work diligently to overcome this problem.
Evaluation of the technical excellence of proposals along with
estimates of long-term costs of competing systems and assessments
of the past performance records of contractors on similar
requirements are important factors for source selection in addition
to those currently used.
Although competition is important to the acquisition process,
there should be less competition for competition's sake. Both the
administrative process for justifying and obtaining authority for
sole-sourcing large procurements (including major weapon
systems) and the use of arbitrary goals for competitive awards
have greatly eroded the quality of the selection process. In a
significant number of current defense procurement programs,
34. The total package procurement concept of the 1960s generally was discredited in
the 1970s, but fixed-price development contracts coupled with priced-production options
used in the 1980s frequently have had the same fundamental effect as total package
procurement. Also, some observers of the Navy's shipbuilding business predict a repeat in
the 1990s of the procurement problems of the 1970s, due in no small degree to a
repetition of the same factors that caused earlier problems.
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little of substance has been added by mechanically focusing on
competition. 5
Competition for government contracts should be predicated on
the positive expectation that overall system performance, including
cost, will be enhanced by the competitive process."' An acquisition
strategy that focuses on price alone is unacceptable. More
comprehensive evaluation of nonpecuniary factors is needed
before awarding a contract on the basis of lowest cost, or when
deciding whether to award the contract on a competitive basis at
all. Among the most important factors that should be considered
are the disruption of changes in managerial and employee
structures, increased instability in the procurement process, and
the performance history of the incumbent contractor. 7
Conclusion
Burnett and Kovacic have written a valuable analysis of
weapons acquisition policy. Its publication comes at a particularly
important time since many view the current acquisition system as
seriously deficient. The Bush Administration, in examining the
effects of the reform efforts of the past eight years, should
consider Burnett and Kovacic's many insightful recommendations
to improve the weapon procurement process.
35. This conclusion is shared widely today by knowledgeable participants in both
government and industry. "We are seeing today the same sorts of acquisition policy mistakes
that characterized the enthusiasm for total package procurement in the 1960s. . . ." Letter
from D. Packard to President Reagan 3 (July 10, 1987) (discussing PRmSiDEN's BLUE RIBBON
CoMU'N ON DEFENSE MANAGEMLEEn, A Quvsr FoR EXCELLENCE-FNAL REPORT TO TI Z PRESIDENT
(1986)) (copy of letter on file with authors).
36. Mark Lumer, Chief of the Compliance Branch, Procurement Directorate, U.S.
Army Communications, Fectronics Command, does not feel that Congress, DOD, or the
defense industry has properly studied the ramifications of our competition policies.
In some cases, in our rush to embrace the concept of competition, we may have
forgotten the common sense test that used to work 99 percent of the time ....
Competition has worked well in many ways, and where it succeeds, it has done so
extraordinarily. But what must be kept in mind is that DOD, as the world's largest
customer, should have in the forefront of its charter the protection of the United
States. [Competition] may not even be cost effective. Compete where it makes sense
Lumer, The Hidden Cost of Competition, CoNu. MGNT. MAG., Jan. 1989, at 16, 16-17.
37. With regard to current sole-source contracts that are being recompeted or "broken
out," factors other than price must be taken into consideration. Resulting losses in
performance and management efficiency may well outweigh any potential monetary savings
effected by a lower unit price. See Address by Donald Hicks, 1988 Air Force Competition
Advocate Conference (former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering),
reprinted in Canan, Competition Is a Mixed Blessing, Am FoRcE MAG., Apr. 1989, at 66, 66-67.

